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A'fl-r ccr:si:ie:vAi \-: lX ^^ uu !l l fro~i ny
rw y-irror^l
r«:r:or^l aut.hc rrss. .ddi fi <
p ^^ttees i n hr.nz an.i d i c t a t e
t h e f o l l c w i n r j.n.".truct±x')S t o j,y or-j'-her ..oel b^c-uisc 1 t r u s t t h a t lie wi.11 fellow
;\y orders a f t r r zKy i f e n c i n g demise.
1 have not t a k e any ..lodicat?-^n i n the l a $ t 2L hours excrrt tv.no r a i n :111s 1 hr apo.
This has very s l i r h t l y affoct c :rv? leers in locorootioji}. 1 ref^ort t:\i.c t o say t h a t
1 a;, of a cle •:• an; sobor and i n Kialdn.: the fcllcvdny d e c l a r a t i o n .
I have a aebt owe.; t o me by r ; . Drotner Wendell concerning his house on S h i r e c l i f f i n .
i n SLC. I w i l l leave wth i.:y v a i l D.-nefajtors i n s t r u c t i o n s t h a t a l l f i n a n c i a l
o b l i f a t i o n s t h a t he (Wendell) has vdth *>e arc to oc cancelled a t my passing. This
statement i s rriy u l t i m a t e u e s i r e concerning t l d s o b l i g a t i o n .
This I do because I b e l i e v e t h a t i n t h e pres .nee of c e r t a i n peo*le and by t h e i r
i n s t r u c t i o n s future w r i t t e n n e g o t i a t i e n s :.ay oe a t t e s t e d t o be made whil« I air undi-r
t h e influence of m e d i c i n e s or coorcicn and not of ny c l e a r , f r e e , and sober c e s i r ' - - .
This I deeply and p o s i t i v e l y brieve could or v.ill happen.
I a l s o o r d e r , i n continued s o b r i e t y , t h a t i f t r d s i n s t r u c t i o n i s n ' t c a r r i e d out by .r-b e n e f a c t o s , a? c l e a r l y d i r e c t e d t o the.., t h a t Wendell be compensate d i n t r e b l e for all
expenses7 l e g a l and o r d i n a r y , he has incurred or w i l l incur i n resiLtin-; the dwellirr
deo:. problem as v/ell as the cancelled d e b t . This I have v e r b a l l y exr^recse:' to so : e .
I handle t i l s with you, r<oel, and not vdth Wendell d i r e c t l y for personal rea ens
I won't e x p l a i n . Here-in i s the documentary re-statement of t h i s o r : . e r .
Also, I handle t h i s s u b j e c t t i l s way i n the hopes t h a t the p r i n c i p a l d era re of .vine
t o be consumated i s 'chat Wendell w i l l be f r e e ; of f i n a n c i a l o b l i g a t i o n s to :•=» find or
my e s t a t e . I handlv i t i d t ; . you A-<oel. so t h a t i f a l l goes as 1 d e s i r e and as i n s t r u c t s
by ::.e t h a t t h i s docuMs.r;. be destro?.red witneut r e v e l a t i o n , i surgest t o you ; .oel a
s n o r t period of w a i t i n g a f t e r ;ny pa^sinj; t o present t h i s docurrat, i f n e ^ e d , in o r ' e r
t o see an accurate p i c t u r e oi t h e develop...eats i f a rroDir-:;; a r i s e s . : o u r judgenett
in tlds.
I t r u s t you i-,o':l as a c o u r f i e r and witness to an:i for t h i s o r d e r .
I order t h e aoove explained c a n c e l l a t i o n of de»-t of Wendell to rr.e or to r* e s t a t e
as part of nr- Fii-al W i l l And Testarnet anc) t h i s order s n a i l supersede any Previous
order of ::dne or any subsequent order of rnine or anyone else on t h i s m a t t e r .

yi
Soberly an., f r e e l y d i c t a t e . , by

S ^ V ^ ^
Grant R. Tav^or
Typod a s d i c t a t e d an'. witnesssd pf
)/
/

"' <M:1<(< (c^-'o
l-.oel . . vaylor

EXHIBIT _fl

(/

i

30 June 1904
After consideration 1 rer.d from :.iy pergonal authorship notes in hand and dictate
the following instructions to iny brother „oel becaurv I trust that he vail follow
my orders after my i. ipendng deiidse.
1 have not taken any Medication in the la .t 2U hours except two pain rills 1 hr ago.
This has very slightly affect d my legs in loco!,.otioii. 1 report tide to say that
I am of a clenr ani sober rdnd in making the follo:an;ff, declaration.
I have a debt owed to mo by my brotner Wen Jell concerning his house on Shirecldff Ln.
in SLC* I will leave wtji my vail benefactors instructions that all financial
obligations that he (Wendell) has vdth iwe are to be cancelled at my passing. This
statement is my ultimate desire concerning this obligation.
This I do because 1 believe that in the pres nee of certain peo* le an I by their
inst uctions future written negotiations .\ay be atteiiitei to be made while I am under
the influence of medicines or coercion and n t of ;i:y c L a r , free, and sober desires.
This I deeply and positively beieve could or vail hap-pen.
I also order, in continued sobriety, that if tnis instruction isn't carried out by nry
benefactos, as clearly airected to then., that Wendell be compensated in treble for all
expenses^ legal and ordinary, he has incurred or vail incur in resisting the dwelling
debt problem as well as the cancelled debt. This I have verbally expressed to some.
I handle tlds with you, i\»oel, and not vdth Wendell directly for personal reasons
1 won't explain. Here-in is the documentary re-staten.ent of this orier.
Also, I handle tlds subject tlds way in the hopes that the principal desire of mine
to be consumated is that Wendell will be free i of financial obligations to me and or
my estate. I handle it vdth you noel so that if all goes as 1 desire and as instructs
by me that ttds document be destroyed vathout revelation. 1 suggest to you noel a
short period of v;aiting after my passing L O present this document, if needed, in order
to see an accurate picture of the developments if a nrob.b ••:.-. arises. Your judgement
in this.
I trust you ^ool as a courfier and v;itness to ani for tlds order.
I order the above explained cancellation of de«»t of 'Vendell to me or to my estate
as part of mv Final Will And Testamot ani this order shall supersede any previous
order of mdne or any suusequent order of ;.dne or an "• .10 else on tlds matter.

)
yt

Soberly and freely dictated b y ^ x O
/
)
Grant It. TavJLor
Typed a s d i c t a t e d ani v.\i tries: :\\ \rf

, , <*V1<( (C
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STANLEY S. ADAMS
Attorney for Plaintiff 0020
521 Sixth Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
(801)
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
STATE OF UTAH
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION
TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

WENDELL E. TAYLOR,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil NO. C85-6869
THE ESTATE OF GRANT TAYLOR,
deceased, ESTHER TAYLOR,
DARRON G. TAYLOR, and JOHN
DOES 1 through 5.

Judge: Raymond Uno

Defendants.
FACTS

LEGAL ARGUMENT
POINT 1
The June 30, 1984 "Will and/or Codicil" was properly
executed in substantial compliance with the necessary
requisites and should therefore be admitted to probate.
The requirements for proper execution of a will in Utah are
set forth in Utah Code Annotated § 75-2-502 as follows:
Except as provided for holographic wills, writings
within section 75-2-573, and wills within section 75-2506, every will shall be in writing signed by the
testator or in the testator's name by some other person

EXHIBIT _C

in the testator's presence and by his direction, and
shall be signed by at least two persons each of whom
witnessed either the signing or the testator's acknowledgement of the signature or of the will.

The signing

by the witnesses must be in the testator's presence and
in the presence of each other.
This statutory provision was enacted in 1975 and was
essentially an adoption of the Uniform Probate Code. The above
provision is identical to section 2-502 of the Uniform Probate
Code except for the addition by the Utah Legislature of the final
sentence.

(Editorial Board Comment to UCA § 75-2-502).

It is

compliance with this final sentence of the Utah provision which
is contested in the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment in
the present case.
Defendant's in their Memorandum cite the purpose of such a
provision is to guard against fraud - Defendant's Memorandum,
P.9; 94 CJS. § Wills

189. Defendant's then rely heavily on the

language used by the Utah Supreme Court in In re. Alexander's
Estate, 139 P.2d 432 (Utah 1943).

There the court stated:

[T]he right to dispose of property by will is governed
and controlled entirely by statute. Such statutes are
mandatory, and, unless strictly complied with, the
instrument, as a will, is void.
139 P.2d at 434. While it appears that the above-quoted language
is non-bending, Plaintiff respectfully urges this Court to
consider several additional factors and similar judicial
2

authority that would lead to a more equitable and just interpretation of the current statute governing execution of wills in
Utah.
The case of In re. Alexander's Estate is a 1943 case.
did not involve the present uniform Probate Code.

It

The testatrix'

will was declared invalid where the testatrix had not signed the
will in the presence of the witnesses, as strictly required by
statute, but she had definitely acknowledged to the witnesses
that the instrument was her will.

The decision was a very close

3-2 decision with Justices Wade and Moffat dissenting.

In his

dissenting opinion Justice Wade stressed the importance of
another Utah Statute which provided that the statutes of this
state be construed liberally and in a manner to promote justice.
139 P.2d at 434.

Justice Wade, in reviewing the facts of the

case, stated that although the testatrix had failed to comply
strictly with the statutory requirements, she clearly thought she
had made a valid will and desired disposition of her property
according to her purported will.

He then concluded that:

the legislative intent that our statutes shall "be
liberally construed with a view to effect the objects
of the statutes and to promote justice"... was undoubtedly enacted to prevent the harsh results of following
too literally the exact wording of the statutes, and,
to my mind, was made for just such a case as we have
here.
139 P.2d at 434.

Justice Moffat concurred in the dissent.

3

The current Utah Code has a similar statute governing construction of this states statutes.

Section 68-3-2 states in part:

The statutes establish the laws of this state respecting the subjects to which they relate, and their
provisions and all proceedings under them are to be
liberally construed with a view to effect the objects
of the statutes and to promote justice.
Other jurisdictions have reached similar conclusions as that
of Justice Wade.

In "In re. Rudd's Estate, 369 P.2d 526 (Mont.

1962) , the Montana Supreme Court, interpreting a similar wills
statute, stated:
This Court has held that the right to make a will
depends upon the consent of the legislature and there
must be strict compliance with the statute, but we have
also declared that substantial compliance with the
statute is sufficient...
369 P.2d at 530 (citation omitted).

The Court also defined

"substantial compliance11 to mean "only that a Court should
determine whether the statute has been followed sufficiently so
as to carry out the intent for which it was adopted.
of the legislation being the elimination of fraud.11
530 (citation omitted).

The intent
369 P. 2d at

Montana also has statutory and public

policies requiring that "a liberal construction be given where
possible to effect the testator's wishes. Klfn re. Estate of
Birkeland, 519 P.2d 154, 156 (Mont. 1974).
adopted a similar policy:
4

Kansas likewise

The will of the testator should be carried out if
reasonably possible and a substantial compliance with
statutory requirements is enough.

Slight or trifling

departures from technical requirements will not operate
to defeat a will.
£n re. Estate of Perkins, 504 P.2d 564, 568 (Kan. 1972).
also^obbs v. Mahonev 478 P.2d 956, 958 (Okl. 1970).

See

(The

Oklahoma Supreme Court adopts the "substantial compliance
doctrine;H literal compliance with the requisites pertaining to
the execution of a will is not required).
Turning to the facts of the case at bar, it is clear that
the June 30, 1984 "Will and/or Codicil" of Grant Ross Taylor was
executed in substantial compliance with the necessary requisites
of Utah Code Annotated

§75-2-502.

The will was signed by Grant

in the presence of both Noel Taylor and Geraldine Taylor, the
attesting witnesses.

Noel witnessed the will with his signature

in the presence of both Grant and Geraldine, the second witness.
Geraldine witnessed the will with her signature in the presence
of Noel, the other witness.

The only element lacking is that

Geraldine failed to sign the instrument in the presence of Grant.
However, the requirements which were literally complied with are
sufficient to protect against fraud, the very purpose for which
the requirements are imposed.

Here it must be reiterated, as

stated by Justice Wade, that:
the legislative intent that our statutes shall "be
liberally construed with a view to effect the objects

5

of the statutes and to promote justice" [UCA 68-3-2],..
was undoubtedly enacted to prevent the harsh results of
following too literally the exact wording of the
statutes, and, to my mind, was made for just such a
case as we have here.
In re. Alexander's Estate, 139 P.2d at 434.
Further support for a liberal construction of the Utah
Probate Code is found in the recent case of Estate of Grossen v.
Vincent. 657 P.2d 1345 (Utah 1983).

There the Utah Supreme Court

considered a different section of the Probate Code, but stated:
The [strict] interpretation urged by the appellants
would make the decedent's will now invalid in this
state; but it could be admitted to probate in any other
state which had adopted the Uniform Probate Code.

We

will not lightly ascribe an interpretation which will
produce such an incongruous result.
657 P.2d at 1346.
To require an absolute and strict compliance with section
75-2-502 as it now reads would likewise result in an "incongruous
result."

The provision at issue in the present case is not a

provision of the Standard Uniform Probate Code.

The very purpose

of the Code was to reduce the formalities for execution of a
witnessed will to a minimum.
75-2-502).

(Editorial Board Comment to UCA§

The Utah statute, although worded slightly different-

ly from the standard Code, should be interpreted consistently
with the intent of the Uniform Probate Code, and consistently

6

with other jurisdiction allowing for substantial compliance, and
consistently with UCA

§68-3-2 providing for liberal construction

to promote justice and equity.

CONCLUSION w
Respectfully submitted this
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day of February, 1986.

y STANLEY S. ADAMS
Attorney for Plaintiff

- CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
"Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgmentff was hand delivered by me to
the offices of P. Bryan Fishburn, Attorney for Defendant,
Callister, Duncan & Nebeker located at Suite 800 Kennecott
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84133, this l r ^

day of Febru-

ary, 1986.
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P ^ y Clerk

Attorneys for Defendants
....-•-.
Esther Taylor, personally and as personal representative of
the Estate of Grant R. Taylor, and Darron Taylor.
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * *

WENDELL E. TAYLOR,

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS1
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT,
DISMISSING ACTION WITH
PREJUDICE, AND AWARDING
DEFENDANTS ATTORNEYS FEES

Plaintiff,
vs.
THE ESTATE OF GRANT TAYLOR,
deceased, ESTHER TAYLOR,
DARRON G. TAYLOR, and
JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH 5.

Civil No. C-85-6869
Judge Raymond Uno

Defendants.
* * * * * * *

Defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendants1
Motion for Attorneys Fees came on regularly for hearing before
the Honorable Raymond S. Uno on Thursday, February 20, 1986, at
8:00 o'clock a.m.

Defendants were represented by Leland S.

McCullough, Esq. and P. Bryan Fishburn, Esq.
represented by Stanley S. Adams, Esq.

EXHIBIT _£.

Plaintiff was

Based upon the Memoranda

filed herein, arguments of counsel, the Affidavit of P. Bryan
Fishburn as to attorneys fees, and good cause appearing,
therefore,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1.

That Defendants* Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby

granted;

2.

That this action is hereby dismissed with prejudice;

3.

That Plaintiff is to pay to Defendants their

and

reasonable attorneys fees incurred in defending against this
action, such fees having been determined by the Court to be in
the amount of $ O > <T*~* - ^

DATED

yzA^sJ
^
f'<*~
^ ^ /

, 1986,

BY THE COURT
-prj^jrZ^t^S^^

Honorable Raymond S. Uno
Third District Court Judge
:?•' "•'•• -'
CDN0643F

ATTEST
H. DIXON HINDLEY
Cle.*

- 2 - *<^Wr^^&$%^

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT. DISMISSING ACTION WITH PREJUDICE. AND AWARDING
DEFENDANTS ATTORNEYS FEES was hand delivered this _>
[npKTU

1986. to the following:

Stanley S. Adams. Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiff
521 6th Avenue
Salt Lake City. Utah 84103

STATE OF UTAH
) „
COUNTY OF SALT LAKf ) * *
I, THE UNDER3SON5D, CLEWC'OF THE DISTRICT
COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH, DO HEREBY
C*»TIFY THAT THE ANNEXED AND .FOREGOING IS
A TRUE ANO FULL COf»V OF AN C*:G!NAL DOCUMENT ON FILE IN MY OFFiC€ AS SUCH CLER*.
W5TNE58 MY HAND A^IO S£AL Of SAIO COURT
TH>8
...rZ,
19 «Y.
fft^Q<'^'^
I I t.w
M i i DAY
W n l OF
Vf
'Mmm—mm-mm
H. qn«ON HINCLEY, CLEjtfK
*.

7 i /

DEPUTY

day of

'Forward", 8A Utah Code Ann., T i t l e 75 (1978)

FOREWORD
This volume contains the complete text of the Utah Uniform Probate
Code adopted by Chapter 150, Laws of 1975, as amended through the Second
Special Session of the Forty-second Legislature, 1978. Various portions of
this Uniform Probate Code, designated as Title 75, either embody, supersede,
or conflict with statutes contained principally in Titles 74 and 75, UTAH
CODE ANNOTATED. The Repealing Clause of Chapter 150 is set forth
following Section 75-1-101.
Annotations to decisions under the former law and later cases are included through Volume 578 Pacific Reporter; 97 Supreme Court Reporter;
575 Federal Reporter (2nd Series) and 449 Federal Supplement. Also contained in this volume as notes, are the official Comments prepared by the
Joint Editorial Board for the Uniform Probate Code, an arm of the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Probate Code. The Comments
have been edited occasionally for adaptation to the Utah version of the
Code.
The index to the Uniform Probate Code prepared by the Joint Editorial
Board, modified in substance as required by variations in the Utah adoption,
begins on page 319.

Uniform Probate Code §2-502 (with commentary)

6
Wills: Execution, Deposit, and
Contractual Arrangements
(Parts 5, 7, and 9 of Article II)

PAKT

5

WILLS

GENERAL COMMENT
Part 5 of Article II deals with
capacity and formalities for execution and revocation of wills,
If the will is to be restored to its
role as the major instrument for
disposition of wealth at death, its
execution must be kept simple,
The basic intent of these sections
is to validate the will whenever
possible. To this end, the age for
making wills is lowered to eighteen, formalities for a written
and attested will are kept to a
Section 2-501.

minimum, holographic wills
written and signed by the testator are authorized, choice of law
as to validity of execution is
broadened, and revocation by
operation of law is limited to divorce or annulment. However,
the statute also provides for a
more formal method of execution with acknowledgment before a public officer (the selfproved will),

[Who May Make a Will.]

Any person 18 or more years of age who is of sound
mind may make a will.
COMMENT
This section states a uniform
minimum age of eighteen for capacity to execute a will. "Minor"
Section 2-502.

is defined in Section 1-201, and
may involve a different age than
that prescribed here.

[Sxocucion,]

JExeent as prcv : ded for holographic wills, wri&iss
within Secdun .\i-3I!?, end wills v/iLhin S-eci:cn 2-cC3,

Uniform Probate Code §2-502 (with commentary)

•

T H E UNIFORM PROBATE CODE PRACTICE MANUAL

every will shall be in writing signed by the testator or
in the testator's name by some other person in the testator's presence and by his direction, and shall be Signed
by at least 2 persons each of whom witnessed either the
signing or the testator's acknowledgment of the signature or of the will.
COMMENT
The formalities for execution
of a witnessed will have been reduced to a minimum. Execution
under this section normally
would be accomplished by signature of the testator and of two
witnesses; each of the persons
signing as witnesses must "witness" any of the following: the
signing of the will by the testator, an acknowledgment by the
testator that the signature is his,
or an acknowledgment by the
testator that the document is his
will. Signing by the testator may
be by mark under general rules
relating to what constitutes a signature; or the will may be signed
on behalf of the testator by another person signing the testator's name at his direction and
in his presence. There is no requirement that the testator pub-

lish the document as his will, or
that he request the witnesses to
sign, or that the witnesses sign
in the presence of the testator or
of each other. The testator may
sign the will outside the presence
of the witnesses if he later acknowledges to the witnesses that
the signature is his or that the
document is his will, and they
sign as witnesses. There is no requirement that the testator's signature be at the end of the will;
thus, if he writes his name in the
body of the will and intends it to
be his signature, this would satisfy the statute. The intent is to
validate wills that meet the minimal formalities of the statute.
A will that does not meet these
requirements may be valid under
Section 2-503 as a holograph.

Utah Code Ann. §68-3-2

(1953)

CONSTRUCTION

68-3-2

68-3-2. Statutes in derogation of common law liberally
construed — Rules of equity prevaiL
The rule of the common law that statutes in derogation thereof are to be
strictly construed has no application to the statutes of this state. The statutes
establish the laws of this state respecting the subjects to which they relate,
and their provisions and all proceedings under them are to be liberally construed with a view to effect the objects of the statutes and to promote justice.
Whenever there is any variance between the rules of equity and the rules of
common law in reference to the same matter the rules of equity shall prevail.
History. R~S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2489;
C.L. 1917, § 5839; ILS. 1933 & C. 1943,
88-2-2.
Cross-References. — One form of civil ac-

tion; law and equity administered in same action, Utah Const., Art. Vm, Sec 19; Rule 2,
U.R.C.P.

Utah Code Ann.

§68-3-11 (1953)

68-3-11. Rules of construction as to words and phrases.
Words and phrases are to be construed according to the context and the
approved usage of the language; but technical words and phrases, and such
others as have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in law. or are
defined by statute, are to be construed according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning or definition.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2497;
CX. 1917, § 5847; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
88-2-11.

Cross-References. — Duty of court to construe statutes, § 78-21-3.

.,, i S /A^ 'fl953,
ed.)
Utah Code Ann
§74-1-5(4)
U ^ , 1976 reprint
^
(repealed 1975 effec. 1977)

744-5. Manner of execution and attestation.—Every will, other than
a nuncupative will, must be in writing, and every will, other than an
olographic or a nuncupative will, must be executed and attested as follows:
(1) It must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself;
(2) The subscription must be made in the presence of the attesting
witnesses;
(3) The testator must at the time of subscribing the same declare
to the attesting witnesses that the instrument is his will; and,
(4) There must be two attesting witnesses, each of whom must sign
his name as a witness at the end of the will, at the testator's request, in
his presence, and in the presence of the other.
History: R. S. 1898 & C. L. 1907, §2735;
C. L. 1917, § 6315; R. S. 1933 & C. 1943,
101-1-5.

/ /

Utah Code Ann.

§75-1-102

(1978)

75-1-102. Purposes—Rule of construction.—(1) This code shall be
liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and
policies.
(2) The underlying purposes and policies of this code are:
(a) To simplify and clarify the law concerning the affairs of decedents, missing persons, protected persons, minors, and incapacitated
persons;
(b) To discover and make effective the intent of a decedent in distribution of his property;
(c) To promote a speedy and efficient system for administering the
estate of the decedent and making distribution to his successors;

Utah Code Ann.

§75-1-201(20)

(Supp. 1986, as amended 1979)

DEFINITIONS

75-1-201

(20) "Interested person" includes heirs, devisees, children, spouses,
creditors, beneficiaries, and any others having a property right in or
claim against a trust estate or the estate of a decedent, ward, or protected person which may be affected by the proceeding. It also includes
persons having priority for appointment as personal representative and
other fiduciaries representing interested persons. The meaning as it
relates to particular persons may vary from time to time and must be determined according to the particular purposes of, and matters involved
in, any proceeding.

U t a h Code Ann.

§75-2-101

(1978)

75-2-101. Intestate estate,—Any part of the estate of a decedent not
effectively disposed of by his will passes to his heirs as prescribed in
the following sections of this code.
History: C. 1953, 75-2-101, enacted
by L. 1975, ch. 150, §3,

;?/

U t a h Code Ann.

§75-2-102

(1978)

75-2-102. Share of the spouse.—(1)
surviving spouse is:

The intestate share of the

(a) If there is no surviving issue or parent of the decedent, the
entire intestate estate;
(b) If there is no surviving issue but the decedent is survived by
a parent or parents, the first $100,000, plus one-half of the balance of
the intestate estate;
(c) If there are surviving issue all of whom are issue of the surviving spouse also, the first $50,000, plus one-half of the balance of the
intestate estate;
(d) If there are surviving issue one or more of whom are not issue
of the surviving spouse, one-half of the intestate estate.
History: C. 1953, 75-2-102, enacted
by L. 1975, ch. 150, § 3.

. . . .

U t a h Code Ann.

§75-2-103

(1978)

75-2-103. Share of heirs other than surviving spouse,—(1) The
part of the intestate estate not passing to the surviving spouse under
section 75-2-102, or the entire intestate estate if there is no surviving
spouse, passes as follows:
(a) To the issue of the decedent by representation.
(b) If there is no surviving issue, to his parent or parents equally.
(c) If there is no surviving issue or parent, to the issue of the
parents or either of them by representation.
(d) If there is no surviving issue, parent, or issue of a parent,
but the decedent is survived by one or more grandparents or issue of
grandparents, half of the estate passes to the paternal grandparents if
both survive, or to the surviving paternal grandparent, or to the issue
of the paternal grandparents if both are deceased, the issue taking by
representation; and the other half passes to the maternal relatives in
the same manner; but if there be no surviving grandparent or issue of
grandparent on either the paternal or the maternal side, the entire
estate passes to the relatives on the other side in the same manner as
the half.
(e) If there is no surviving issue, parent or issue of a parent,
grandparent or issue of a grandparent, then the entire estate passes
to the next kin in equal degree, excepting that when there are two or
more collateral kindred in equal degree, but claiming through different
ancestors, those who claim through the nearest ancestor must be preferred to those claiming through an ancestor more remote.
History: C. 1953, 75-2-103, enacted
by L. 1975, ch. 150, § 3.

•

•
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de Ann.

§75-2-502

(1978)

75-2-502, Execution,—Except as provided for holographic wills, writings within section 75-2-513, and wills within section 75-2-506, every
will shall be in writing signed by the testator or in the testator's name
by some other person in the testator's presence and by his direction, and
shall be signed by at least two persons each of whom witnessed either
the signing or the testator's acknowledgment of the signature or of the
will., The signing by the witnesses must be in the testator's presence
and in the presence of each other.
History: C 1953, 75-2-502, enacted
by U 1975, cfa. 150, § 3.
Editorial Board Comment.
The formalities for execution of a witnessed will have been reduced to a minimum. Execution under this section normally would be accomplished by signature of the testator and of two witnesses;
each of the persons signing as witnesses
must "witness" any of the following:
the signing of the will by the testator,
an acknowledgment by the testator that
the signature is his, or an acknowledgment by the testator that the document
is his will. Signing by the testator may
be by mark under general rules relating
to what constitutes a signature; or the
will may be signed on behalf of the
testator by another person signing the
testator's name at his direction and in
his presence. There is no requirement
that the testator publish the document
as his will, or that he request the wi&
nesses to sign, or that the witnesses
sijrn in the presence of the testator or of
each other. The testator may sign the
will outside the presence of the witnesses
if he later acknowledges to the witnesses
that the signature is his or that the document is his will, and they sign as witnesses. [Last sentence in Utah version
omitted in official text of Code.] There
is no requirement that the testator's
signature be at the end of the will; thus,
if he writes his name in the body of
the will and intends it to be his signature, this would satisfy the statute. The
intent is to validate wills which meet
the minimal formalities of the statute.
A will which does not meet these requirements may be valid under section
75-2-503 as a holograph.

Cross- References.
Probate and administration, 75-3-101
et seq.
Proof of will, 78-25-12.
Collateral References.
Wills<S=3lll, 113-123.
94 CJ.S. Wills §§ 169-177,182-197.
79 Am. Jur. 2d 430, Wills § 210.
Also see Am. Jur. 2d, New Topic
Service, Uniform Probate Code.
Admissibility and credibility of testimony of subscribing witness tending to
impeach execution of will or testamentary capacity of testator, 79 A. L. R.
394.
Admissibility of evidence other than
testimony of subscribing witnesses to
prove due execution of will, or testamentary capacity, 63 A. L. R. 1195.
Admissibility of testator's declarations
upon issue of genuineness or due execution of purported will, 62 A. L. R. 2d
855.
Assistance: validity of will signed by
testator with the assistance of another,
9814A. L. R. 2d 824.
Attestation" or "witnessing" of will,
required
by statute, as including witnesses 1 subscription, 45 A. L. R. 2d 1365.
Beneficiary under nuncupative will as
witness thereto, 23 A. L. R. 2d 796.
Character as w i t n e s s of one who
signed will for another purpose, 8 A . L
R. 1075.
Character of instrument as will, or its
admissibility to probate as such, as affected by its failure to make any disposition of property or by fact that
there is no beneficiary entitled to take
thereunder, 147 A. L. R. 636.
Codicil as affecting application of statutory provision to will, or previous codicil not otherwise subject, or as obviating
objections to lack of testamentary ca-

i Code Ann.

§75-3-303(3)

(1978)
i

75-3-303. Informal probate—Proof and findings required.—(1) In
an informal proceeding for original probate of a will, the registrar shall
determine whether:
(a) The application is complete;
(b) The applicant has made oath or affirmation that the statements
contained in the application are true to the best of his knowledge and
belief;
(c) The applicant appears from the application to be an interested
person as defined in subsection 75-1-201 (20);
(d) On the basis of the statements in the application, venue is
proper;
(e) An original, duly executed and apparently unrevoked will is in
the registrar's possession;
(f) Any notice required by section 75-3-204 has been given and that
the application is not within section 75-3-304; and
(g) It appears from the application that the time limit for original
probate has not expired.
(2) The application shall be denied if it indicates that a personal
representative has been appointed in another county of this state or
except as provided in subsection (4) below, if it appears that this or
another wUl of the decedent has been the subject of a previous probate
order.
(3) A will which appears to have the required signatures and which
contains an attestation clause showing that requirements of execution
under sections 75-2-502, 75-2-503, or 75-2-506 have been met shall be
probated without further proof. In other cases, the registrar may assume execution if the will appears to have been properly executed, or he
may accept a sworn statement or affidavit of any person having knowledge of the circumstances of execution, whether or not the person was a
witness to the will.
(4) Informal probate of a will which has been previously probated
elsewhere may be granted at any time upon written application by any
interested person, together with deposit of an authenticated copy of the
will and of the statement probating it from the office or court where
it was first probated.
(5) A will from a place which does not provide for probate of a will
after death and which is not eligible for probate under subsection (1)
above may be probated in this state upon receipt by the registrar of a
duly authenticated copy of the will and a duly authenticated certificate
of its legal custodian that the copy filed is a true copy and that the will
has become operative under the law of the other place.
History: C. 1953, 75-3-303, enacted
by L. 1975, ch, 150, §4.

Utah Code Ann.

§75-3-401

(1978)

Part 4
Formal Testacy and Appointment Proceedings
75-3-401. Formal testacy proceedings—Nature—When commenced.—
(1) A formal testacy proceeding is litigation to determine whether a
decedent left a valid will. A formal testacy proceeding may be commenced by an interested person filing a petition as described in subsection 75-3-402 (1) in which he requests, that the court, after notice
and hearing, enter an order probating a will, or a petition to set aside
an informal probate of a will or to prevent informal probate of a will
which is the subject of a pending application, or a petition in accordance
with subsection 75-3-402 (3) for an order that the decedent died intestate.
(2) A petition may seek formal probate of a will without regard
to whether the same or a conflicting will has been informally probated.
A formal testacy proceeding may, but need not, involve a request for
appointment of a personal representative.
(3) During the pendency of a formal testacy proceeding, the registrar shall not act upon any application for informal probate of any
will of the decedent or any application for informal appointment of a
personal representative of the decedent.
(4) Unless a petition in a formal testacy proceeding also requests
confirmation of the previous informal appointment, a previously appointed personal representative, after receipt of notice of the commencement of a formal probate proceeding, must refrain from exercising his
power to make any further distribution of the estate during the pendency of the formal proceeding. A petitioner who seeks the appointment
of a different personal representative in a formal proceeding also may
request an order restraining the acting personal representative from
exercising any of the powers of his office and requesting the appointment of a special administrator. In the absence of a request, or if the
request is denied, the commencement of a formal proceeding has no
effect on the powers and duties of a previously appointed personal
representative other than those relating to distribution.
History: C. 1953, 75-3-401, enacted
by L. 1975, ch. 150, § 4 ; L. 1977, ch. 194,
§27.

r

&

U t a h Code Ann.

§75-3-402

(1978)

75-3-402. Formal testacy or appointment proceedings—Petition—
Contents.—(1) Petitions for formal probate of a will, or for adjudication of intestacy with or without request for appointment of a
personal representative, must be directed to the court, request a judicial
order after notice and hearing, and contain further statements as
indicated in this section. A petition for formal probate of a will:
(a) Requests an order as to the testacy of the decedent in relation
to a particular instrument which may or may not have been informally
probated and determining the heirs;
(b) Contains the statements required for informal applications as
stated in subsection 75-3-301 (2) and the statements required by subsections 75-3-301 (3) (b) ahd (c), and, if the petition requests appointment of a personal representative, the statements required by subsection
75-3-301 (4); and
(c) States whether the original of the last will of the decedent
is in the possession of the court or accompanies the petition.
(2) If the original will is neither in the possession of the court
nor accompanies the petition and no authenticated copy of a will
probated in another jurisdiction accompanies the petition, the petition
also must state the contents of the will and indicate that it is lost,
destroyed, or otherwise unavailable.
(3) A petition for adjudication of intestacy and appointment of an
administrator in intestacy must request a judicial finding and order
that the decedent left no will and determining the heirs, contain the
statements required by subsections 75-3-301 (2) and 75-3-301 (5) and
indicate whether supervised administration is sought A petition may
request an order determining intestacy and heirs without requesting
the appointment of an administrator, in which case, the statements
required by subsection 75-3-301 (5) (b) above may be omitted.
History: C. 1953, 75-3-402, enacted
by L. 1975, ch. 150, § 4 ; L. 1977, ch. 194,
§23.

?7

U t a h Code Ann.

§75-3-409

(1978)

75-3-409. Formal testacy proceedings—Order—Foreign will.—After
the time required for any notice has expired, upon proof of notice,
and after any hearing that may be necessary, if the court finds that
the testator is dead, venue is proper and that the proceeding was commenced within the limitation prescribed by section 75-3-107, it shall
determine the decedent's domicile at death, his heirs, and his state of
testacy. Any will found to be valid and unrevoked shall be formally
probated. Termination of any previous informal appointment of a personal representative, which may be appropriate in view of the relief
requested and findings, is governed by section 75-3-612. The petition
shall be dismissed or appropriate amendment allowed if the court is
not satisfied that the alleged decedent is dead. A will from a place
which does not provide for probate of a will after death may be proved
for probate in this state by a duly authenticated certificate of its legal
custodian that the copy introduced is a true copy and that the will has
become effective under the law of the other place.
History: C. 1953, 75-3-409, enacted
by L. 1975, ch. 150, § 4.

U t a h Code Ann.

§75-3-703.(1).

'(1978)

75-3-703. General duties—Relation and liability to persons interested
in estate—Standing to sue,—(1) A personal representative is a fiduciary who shall observe the standard of care applicable to trustees as
described by section 75-7-302. A personal representative is under a duty
to settle and distribute the estate of the decedent in accordance with
the terms of any probated and effective will and this code and as expeditiously and efficiently as is consistent with the best interests of
the estate. He shall use the authority conferred upon him by this code,
the terms of the will, if any, and any order in proceedings to which
he is party for the best interests of successors to the estate.

*\s:

Utah Code Ann.

§78-27-56

(Supp.

1986)

MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

78-27-57

78-27-56. Attorney's fees — Award where action or defense in bad faith.
In civil actions, where not otherwise provided by statute or agreement,
the court may award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the
court determines that the action or defense to the action was without merit
and not brought or asserted in good faith.
History: L. 1981, ch. 13, § 1.

I-

Utah R. App. p.

2

(with Advisory Commi

t t e e Note)

Rule 2. Suspension of Rules,
In the interest of expediting a decision, the Supreme Court on its own
motion or for extraordinary cause shown, may, except as to the provisions of
Rules 4(a), 4(e) and 5(a), suspend the requirements or provisions of any of
these Rules in a particular case and may order proceedings in that case in
accordance with its direction.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
The principal objective of this Rule is to
reaffirm the power of the Supreme Court to

suspend any one or more of these Rules in
order to either expedite the appellate process

or avoid a manifest miscarriage of justice.
It is not intended by this Rule that the time
fixed for taking an appeal to or seeking review
by the Supreme Court may be extended or
suspended. Rule 22(b) prohibits the Supreme

Court from extending or suspending the t i ^ l l
for appeal or review and the district coun ^ '
likewise prohibited except as provided hv D K H
y
4(e).
^"a-

U t a h R. A p p . P .

3(a)

. >-*x4
*&
V-$J
\r±v&

TITLE II. APPEALS FROM JUDGMENTS AND '38
ORDERS OF DISTRICT COURTS.
"1
Rule 3o Appeal as of Right: How Taken.
(a) Filing Appeal from Final Orders and Judgments. An appeal may be
taken from a district court to the Supreme Court from all final orders and
judgments, except as otherwise provided by law, by filing a notice of appeal
with the clerk of the district court within the time allowed by Rule 4. Failure
of an appellant to take any step other than the timely filing of a notice of
appeal does not affect the validity of the appeal, but is ground only for such
action as the Supreme Court deems appropriate, which may include dismissal
of the appeal or other sanctions short of dismissal, as well as the award of
attorney's fees.

U t a h R. A p p . 4 ( w i t h A d v i s o r y Committee N o t e )

Rule 4. Appeal as of Right: When Taken.
(a) Appeal from Final Judgment and Order. In a case in which an appeal is
permitted as a matter of right from the district court to the Supreme Court,
the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the
district court within 30 days after the date of entry of.the judgment or order
appealed from; provided however, when a judgment or order is entered in a
statutory forcible entry or unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal
required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the district court within 10
days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from.
(b) Motions Post Judgment or Order. If a timely motion under the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure is filed in the district court by any party: (1) for
judgment under Rule 50(b); (2) under Rule 52(b) to amend or make additional
findings of fact, whether or not an alteration of the judgment would b P l
required if the motion is granted; (3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend th-f^
judgment; or (4) under Rule 59 for a new trial, the time for appeal for all ^fl
parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting ^P
or denying any other such motion. Similarly, if a timely motion under the "^1
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is filed in the district court by any party ^1
(1) under Rule 24 for a new trial; or (2) under Rule 26 for an order, after r
judgment, affecting the substantial rights of a defendant, the time for appeal
for all parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or
granting or denying any other such motion. A notice of appeal filed before the
disposition of any of the above motions shall have no effect. A new notice of
appeal must be filed within the prescribed time measured from the entry of
the order of the district court disposing of the motion as provided above.
(c) Filing Prior to Entry of Judgment or Order. Except as provided in
paragraph (b) of this Rule, a notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a
decision, judgment or order but before the entry of the judgment or order of
the district court shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day
thereof.
(d) Additional or Cross Appeal. If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a
party, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date
on which the first notice of appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise
prescribed by paragraph (a) of this Rule, whichever period last expires.
(e) Extension of Time to Appeal. The district court, upon a showing of
excusable neglect or good cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of
appeal upon motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the
time prescribed by paragraph (a) of this Rule. Any such motion which is filed
before expiration of the prescribed time may be ex parte unless the district
court otherwise requires. Notice of any such motion which is filed after
expiration of the prescribed time shall be given to the other parties in
accordance with the district court rules of practice. No extension shall exceed
30 days past the prescribed time or 10 days from the date of entry of the order
granting the motion, whichever occurs later.

2-Z

Utah R. App

4

(with Advisory Committee Note)
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE

Paragraph (a). Coupled with Rule 3, this
paragraph requires that a notice of appeal be
filed with the clerk of the district court within
30 days after the date of entry of judgment or
order from which the appeal is taken. There
are two significant changes in appellate procedure from prior practice under Rule 73(a)
URCivP: (1) the time frame within which the
appeal must be taken is 30 days rather than
one month: and (2) the 30-day period commences to run after the date of the "entry of
the judgment or order" rather than "from the

Utah Code Ann. 1953 as amended), with the.
'exception that in statutory forcible entry and
unlawful detainer actions, an appeal shall be
taJcen within 10 days from the entry of the
final judgment or order appealed from. The 30jjay time limit will qualify the "one month"
appeal period set out in 78-3a-51 Utah Code
Ann. 1953 as amended, for a direct appeal from
a juvenile court.
Because of the conversion to microfilm filing
process by the clerks of the various district
courts, the Register of Actions Book is no
longer maintained in some counties as contemplated in prior Rule 73(a) and 79(a) URCivP.
The date of "entry of the judgment or order'
from which the appeal is taken is considered to
be the day on which the judgment or order is
"filed" with the district court clerk. See Rule
58A(c) URCivP. It is the Committee's judgment that when the clerk receives and stampsin the judgment or order, the document is
"filed" under Rule 58A and under this Rule 4.
This paragraph requires that a notice of
appeal from a final judgment or order in a
criminal case be filed within 30 days after the
date of entry of the judgment or order appealed
from, State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36 (Utah
1981), except that in a capital case where the
death sentence has been imposed, the case is
automatically appealed to and reviewed by the
Court. Rule 26(h) URCrimP. It is the Committee's view that even in capital cases involving
the death sentence, a notice of appeal should be
filed under this paragraph so that the appellate process incident to preparation and transmittal of the record may commence in a timely
manner.
Paragraph (h). This paragraph retains the
concept under prior Rule 73(a) URCivP that a
timely filed motion under Rule 50(b). 52(b) or
Rule 59 shall toll the date from which the time
for appeal commences to run. In the event of
such a motion, the time for appeal under

:

I. General Consideration.
II. When Appeal to Be Taken.
III. Cross-Appeals.

date of the entry of the judgment or order in
the Register of Actions''.
The one month time frame under prior Rule
73(a) was determined to be both inconsistent
and confusing, at least measured against a
more definite 30-day time limit. Computation
of time is defined under Rule 22(a). It is
intended that the 30-day time limit within
which to appeal from a final judgment or order
of the district court or a juvenile court shall be
applicable in all cases, notwithstanding a
statute or other rule to the contrary (see 78-2-4

paragraph (a) commences from the date of
entry of the order denying a new trial or
granting or denying any other motion. The
paragraph adopts the provision of Rule 4(a)(4)
FRAP that a notice of appeal filed before the
disposition of a motion under Rule 50(b), 52(b),
or 59 has no effect and must be filed within the
prescribed time after the entry of the order by
the district court disposing of the motion.
Paragraph (c). This paragraph has no counterpart in prior Utah practice. It is, in substantial part, an adoption of Rule 4(a)(2) FRAP.
Paragraph (d). This paragraph changes the
practice in Utah with regard to cross-appeals
(see prior Rule 74(b) URCivP) and requires
that a notice of the cross-appeal be filed within
14 days after the date of the first notice of
appeal. The paragraph adopts substantially
the time period and concept of cross-appeal in
Rule 4(a)(3) FRAP.
Paragraph (eh This paragraph retains the
prior practice under Rule 73(a) URCivP that
the time for filing a notice of appeal may be
extended by the district court, upon a showing
of excusable neglect or good cause, if a motion
for extension is filed not later than 30 days
after the expiration of the time prescribed in
paragraphs (a) or (b). The application shall be
on motion and may be ex parte (although ex
parte practice is not encouraged) if filed prior
to the expiration of the time for appeal. The
district court may not grant an extension
exceeding 30 days past the original time for
appeal or 10 days from the date of entry of the
order granting the motion, whichever occurs
later. Excusable neglect or good cause under
this paragraph refers generally to an extraordinary circumstance that prevented the
movant from filing a timely notice of appeal
and not to inadvertence or oversight on the
part of counsel or to the failure of the client to
authorize an appeal.

3</

R. App. P. 22(b)

Rule 22. Computation and Enlargement of Time.
(a) Computation of Time. In computing any period of time prescribed by
these Rules, by an order of the Court, or by any applicable statute, the day of
the act, event, or default from which the designated period of time begins to
run shall not be included. The last day of the period shall be included, unless
it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday, in which event the period
extends until the end of the next day which is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a
legal holiday. When the period of time prescribed or allowed is less than 7
days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays shall be excluded
in the computation. As used in this Rule "legal holiday" includes days
designated as holidays by the President, the Congress of the United States or
the State of Utah.
(b) Enlargement of Time. The Court for good cause shown may upon motion
enlarge the time prescribed by these Rules or by its order for doing any act, or
may permit an act to be done after the expiration of such time, but the Court
-i

may not enlarge the time for filing a notice of appeal, or a petition for review !
from an order of an administrative agency, except as specifically authorized
by law. A motion for enlargement of time shall:
(1) state with particularity the reasons for granting the motion;
(2) state whether the movant has previously been granted an enlargement of time, and if so, the number and duration of such enlargements;
and
(3) state when the time will expire for doing the act for which' the
enlargement of time is sought.
(c) Ex Parte Motion. Except as to enlargements of time for filing and
service of briefs under Rule 26(a), a party may file one ex parte motion for
enlargement of time not to exceed 14 days if no enlargement of time has been
previously granted, if the time has not already expired for doing the act for
which the enlargement is sought, and if the motion otherwise complies with
the requirements and limitations of paragraph (b) of this Rule.
(d) Additional Time After Service by Mail. Whenever a party is required or
permitted to do an act within a prescribed period after service of a paper upon
him and the paper is served by mail, 3 days shall be added to the prescribed
period.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
Paragraph (a). This Rule on computation
and enlargement of time comports with prior
practice and procedure in Utah, see Rule 6(a),
(b) and (e), URCivP, and follows the principal
provisions of Rule 26, FRAP.
Paragraph (c). For judicial convenience and
flexibility in the time requirements of an
appeal, this paragraph allows for a filing of one
ex parte motion for an enlargement of time not
to exceed 14 days if no enlargement of time has
been previously granted, if the motion is

supported by good cause, and if the time has
not already expired for doing the act for which
the enlargement is sought. However, the paragraph does not permit an ex parte motion for
an enlargement of time for the filing of appellate briefs under Rule 26. Moreover, this
paragraph does not authorize an ex parte
motion for an enlargement of time to die a
notice of appeal or a petition for review. See
paragraph lb).

• Civ. P. 11 (prior to 1985 Amendment)

Rule 11.

Signing of Pleadings

Every pleading of a party represented by an attorney shall
be signed in his individual name by at least one attorney who
is duly licensed to practice in the state of Utah. The address of
the attorney and that of the party shall be stated. Every party
who is not represented by an attorney shall sign his pleadings
and state his address. Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by
an affidavit The signature of any attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading; that to the best of his
knowledge, information and belief there is good ground to support it, and that it is not interposed for delay. If a pleading is not
signed or is signed with intent to defeat the purpose of this rule
it may be stricken as sham and false and the action may proceed
as though the pleading had not been filed. For a wilful violation
of this rule an attorney may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary action. Similar action may be taken if scandalous or indecent matter is inserted.

&

U t a h R. C i v . P . 1 1 ' ( a s . amended, e f f e c . S e p t .
(1986 M i c h i e p a p e r b o u n d e d . )
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Rule 11. Signing of Pleadings, Motions, and Other Papers;
Sanctions.
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an
attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual
name who is duly licensed to practice in the state of Utah. The attorney's
address also shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney
shall sign his pleading, motion, or other paper and state his address. Except
when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be
verified or accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity that the averments of
an answer under oath must be overcome by the testimony of two witnesses or
of one witness sustained by corroborating circumstances is abolished. The
signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he has
read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge,
information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in
fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not
interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion,
or other paper is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly
after the omission is called to the attention of the pleader or movant. If a
pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court,
upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who
signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may
include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the
reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or
other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
(Amended, effective Sept. 4,1985.)
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(as p r i o r t o amendment.effee. J a n . 1, 1987)

Utah R. Civ.

Rule 52. Findings by the Court.
(a) Effect In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule
58A; and in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall
similarly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute
the grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes
of review. The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them,
shall be considered as the findings of the court. Findings of fact and
conclusions of law are unnecessary on decisions of motions under Rule 12 or
56 or any other motion except as provided in Rule 4Kb).

5?

U t a h R. C i v P . 56 "•

Rule 56.

Summary Judgment

(a) For Claimant A party seeking to recover upon a claim,
counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment
may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary
judgment by the adverse party, move with or without supporting
affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any
part thereof.
(b) For Defending Party. A party against whom a claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment
is sought, may, at any time, move with or without supporting
affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any
part thereof.
(c) Motion and Proceedings Thereon. The motion shall be
served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The
adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing
affidavits. The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary
judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the
issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the
amount of damages.
COMMITTEE NOTE: Rule 56(c) was amended by the Supreme Court on
June 30, 1965t effective October 1, 1965. The amendment inserted "answers to interrogatories" in the third sentence.

(d) Case Not Fully Adjudicated on Motion. If on motion
under this rule judgment is not rendered upon the whole case
or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the
hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable
ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy
and what material facts ire actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts
that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent
to which the amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are
just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.

3*
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(e) Form of Affidavits; Further Testimony; Defense Required.
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent
to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies
of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be
attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit
affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers
to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule,
an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials
of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
COMMITTEE NOTE: Rule 56(e) was amended by the Supreme Court
on June 30, 1965. effective October 1, 1965. The amendment added the
words "Defense Required" in the caption, inserted "answers to interrogatories" after "depositions" and deleted the word "by" before "further
affidavits" in the third sentence, and added the last two sentences.

If) When Affidavits are Unavailable. Should it appear from the
affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons
stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition,
the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a
continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be
taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is
just.
(g) Affidavits Made in Bad Faith. Should it appear to the
satisfaction of the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith or solely
for the purpose of delay* the court shall forthwith order the party
employing them to pay to the other party the amount of the
reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused him
to incur, reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt.

U t a h R. C i v . P . 5 8 A ( c ) a n d ( d )

Rule 58A

(1986 p a p e r b o u n d M i c h i e

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

ed.)

Rule 58A

(c) When Judgment Entered; Notation in Register ofActions and Judgment
Docket A judgment is complete and shall be deemed entered for all purposes,
except the creation of a lien on real property, when the same is signed and
filed as herein above provided. The clerk shall 'immediately make a notation
of the judgment in the register of actions and the judgment docket.
(d) Notice of Signing or Entry of Judgment The prevailing party shall
promptly give notice of the signing or entry of judgment to all other parties
and shall file proof of service of such notice with the clerk of the court.

¥/

Utah R. Civ. P. 58(c) and (d)

(1953 and Supp. 1986)

(c) When Judgment Entered; Notation in Register of Actions and
Judgment Docket A judgment is complete and shall be deemed entered
for ail purposes, except the creation of a lien on real property, when
the same is signed and filed as herein above provided. The clerk shall
^mediately make a notation of the judgment in the register of actions
and the judgment docket.
(d) Judgment After Death of a Party. If a party dies after a verdict
' or decision upon any issue of fact and before judgment, judgment may
nevertheless be rendered thereon.

U t a h R. C i v . P . 5 8 ( c )

and ( d )

.;,;';•

(Supp.

JUDGMENT

1986)

Rule 59

(c) When Judgement Entered; Notation in Register of Actions and
Judgment Docket
"Filed."
Compliance with Rule 2.9(b), Rules of Practice — Dist. and Cir. Ct, which requires that
a copy of proposed findings or judgments be
served on opposing counsel before being pre-

sented to the Court, is necessary before a
judgment is considered "filed" under this rule
and, therefore, appealable. Wayne GarfF
Constr. Co. v. Richards (Utah 1985) 706 P.2d
1065.

(d) Judgment After Death of a Party. If a party dies after a verdict or
decision upon any issue of fact and before judgment, judgment may nevertheless be rendered thereon.
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